Estimating Risk Attitudes Using Lotteries; A Large Sample Approach by Donkers, A.C.D. et al.






Attitudes towards risk play a major role in many economic decisions. In
empirical studies one quite often assumes that attitudes towards risk do not
vary across individuals. This papers questions this assumption and analyses
which factors in￿uence an individual’s risk attitude. Based on questions on
lotteries in a large household survey we semiparametrically estimate an index
for risk aversion. We only make weak assumptions about the underlying deci-
sion process, and our estimation method allows for generalisations of expected
utility. We ﬂnd strong links between risk aversion and gender, education level,
and income of the individual. We also estimate a structural model based on
Cumulative Prospect Theory and ﬂnd that the value function depends on an
index that is very similar to the index of risk aversion. Expected utility is
strongly rejected and the probability weighting function varies signiﬂcantly
with gender, age, and income of the individual.
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Attitudes towards risk are important in many economic decisions. In empirical stud-
ies of economic behavior, however, direct information about attitudes towards risk is
hardly ever available. This paper uses a large Dutch household survey that contains
both direct information on respondents’ attitudes towards risk and a lot of back-
ground information on the respondents. We use these data to investigate whether
attitudes towards risk vary with other observed characteristics fo the respondents,
such as age and income. Whether and how an individual’s attitude towards risk
varies with observed characteristics can be helpful in empirical studies where this
type of information is not present, but the background characteristics are observed.
Our inference on attitudes towards risk is based upon a set of eight questions
on lotteries that are present in the data. In ﬂve of these questions the respondents
have to make a choice between two lotteries. The remaining three questions are
probability equivalence questions. Here the respondents have to state the minimum
probability of winning a given prize, which would make them indiﬁerent between
such a lottery and a given amount of money. Both types of questions have a risky
(high variance) and a safe (low or zero variance) option. We use these data to
distinguish between more and less risk averse individuals.
To see how an individual’s attitude towards risk relates to other observed char-
acteristics we start with a very general semiparametric model. We do not use any
economic or psychological theory, but we only impose a single index restriction and
a monotonicity condition, such that the index represents the individual’s risk aver-
sion. The estimation results show a signiﬂcant relationship between risk aversion
and age, gender, education level, and income.
The semiparametric model is too general to permit a clear cut interpretation
of the consequences of diﬁerences in attitudes towards risk. Therefore, we set up a
structural model for the individual’s decision process. Expected utility theory seems
a good starting point in analyzing decisions under uncertainty. However, within the
1experimental psychology literature considerable evidence is reported against the
validity of expected utility when individuals answer questions on lotteries, see, for
example, Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), or Machina (1987). Instead of the
expected utility framework we will use Cumulative Prospect Theory as developed
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Expected
utility can be seen as a special case of Cumulative Prospect Theory. The index
for risk aversion we ﬂnd with the structural model is quite similar to the one we
obtained with the semiparametric model. This gives us an interpretation of the
semiparametric estimation results.
The approach we take is possible since the data contain the questions related
to risk attitudes as well as many background variables for almost 4,000 individuals.
This contrasts with the datasets that have been used until now to derive measures for
individuals’ attitudes towards risk. In the experimental psychology and economics
literature the datasets are, in general, rather small, consisting of no more than 200
individuals, and contain hardly any background information. The respondents in
these studies are also very often students and the results are thus not representative
of the population of interest. The presence of small datasets is illustrated by the fact
that Harless and Camerer (1994) merge a total of 23 datasets to obtain nearly 8,000
choices, where at least 3 choices are made by each individual. Our results will be
based on more than 20,000 choices. In the economics literature an indirect measure
of risk aversion is sometimes derived from observed behavior, but these results are
quite sensitive to many real life aspects that are unrelated to risk aversion. Example
of this line of research are P” alsson (1996), who estimates risk aversion from portfolio
choices, and Guiso et al. (1992), who derive a measure of risk aversion from savings
data. A ﬂnal branch in the literature uses large datasets from, for instance, TV
shows or bets on horse races, but these datasets address very speciﬂc populations
and contain no background information on the individuals making the decisions
(see, for example, Beetsma and Schotman (1997) and Jullien and Salanie (1997)).
2An exception is Hartog et al. (1997), who use a dataset which contains almost
2,000 individuals and a lot of background information, but direct information on
risk attitudes is provided by only a single question.
Information on how risk aversion varies across individuals can be useful in pre-
dicting savings or stock holdings of an individual or household, since risk aversion
plays an important role in these decisions. However, the existing empirical literature
on modelling savings and portfolio choices focuses mainly on the eﬁect of income
risk and makes restrictive assumptions about the individuals’ attitudes towards risk.
For example, Lusardi (1997) estimates a single coe–cient for risk aversion, which
is constant across all individuals, while Guiso et al. (1992) allow risk aversion to
depend only on lifetime resources. The present paper shows that attitudes towards
risk also vary with other individual characteristics. Our analysis indicates which
variables should be used to model attitudes towards risk in empirical applications,
where no direct information on risk attitudes is available.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We start with a detailed
description of the data in Section 2. Section 3 presents the reduced form model
and the semiparametric estimation techniques we will use, while Section 4 presents
the semiparametric estimation results. Section 5 discusses the individual’s decision
making process, where we pay special attention to Cumulative Prospect Theory.
Section 6 presents the structural model based on Cumulative Prospect Theory and
its estimation results. Section 7 concludes.
2D a t a
The data we use come from the ﬂrst wave of the VSB-Panel data, drawn in 1993,
and consist of 2780 households, divided into two panels. One is designed to be rep-
resentative of the Dutch population, the other is a random sample of the households
in the upper 10% of the income distribution in The Netherlands. All households
participating have been provided with a personal computer and answer the survey
3questions directly on their PC; no personal interviews are held. The VSB-panel
is a rich source of data, including information on household composition, income,
assets and psychological concepts. A detailed description of the data can be found
in Nyhus (1996). The total numbers of households in the representative and high
income panel answering the relevant psychological questionnaire are 1463 and 783,
with a total number of individual respondents of 2297 and 1652, respectively.
This psychological questionnaire contains a set of questions on lotteries. This
set of questions consists of two types of questions (see Appendix A.1 for the precise
w o r d i n go ft h eq u e s t i o n s ) :
1. The ﬂrst type of question deals with choices between two lotteries. Each time
the respondent is oﬁered two lotteries, each one with two possible outcomes
with given probabilities,2 and the respondent has to state which of the two
lotteries he or she prefers. It is mentioned that there do not exist right or wrong
answers to these questions. We refer to these questions as choice questions.
Five questions of this type are asked with varying outcomes and probabilities.
2. The second type of question deals with the imaginary situation where a certain
amount of money has been won and the individual has the opportunity to buy
a lottery ticket with this money. This lottery ticket has a single prize of
D￿ 20,0003 and the question is how large the probability of winning this D￿
20,000 has to be at least, to make the respondent willing to exchange the
money for the lottery ticket. The amount of money that can be won and is
exchanged for the lottery ticket is varied over the questions. We refer to these
questions as probability equivalence questions.
Three questions of this type are asked.
The answers to the questions of the ﬂrst type will be referred to by CH1;C H 2;
:::;CH5 and are depicted in Table 1: We call the low variance lottery the safest
2In one case one alternative is winning zero with probability one.
3D￿ 1 was approximately US$ 0.50 by the end of 1993
4option and the high variance lottery the riskiest option. A value 1 corresponds
to the choice of the risky option, while 0 indicates that the safe option is chosen.
Individuals opting for the safe lottery are called more risk averse than individuals
who choose the risky option.
The answers to the questions of the second type, the probability equivalence
questions, will be referred to by PE1;P E 2; and PE3: The answers indicate the
probability (in %) of winning the prize of D￿ 20,000 for which the individual is
indiﬁerent between the lottery and an amount of money for sure of, respectively,
D￿ 200 (PE1), D￿ 1000 (PE2), and D￿ 5000 (PE3). The variables range from
0% to 100%. A higher probability of winning the prize implies a more attractive
lottery. A more risk averse individual will thus give higher answers. The fact
that a higher probability of winning corresponds to a more attractive lottery also
implies a logical consistency requirement that PE1 <P E 2 <P E 3; if marginal
utility of money is positive (more is better). Otherwise individuals would prefer
a stochastically dominated alternative. By now it is well known that probability
equivalence questions result in overestimation of the level of risk aversion, due to,
for example, response mode bias. In the questions we analyze individuals who have
to give up money to participate, which might strengthen this bias.
In total we have 3949 individuals in our sample if we use both the representative
panel and the high income panel. In the ﬂnal analysis we will condition upon income,
so there will be no eﬁect of the overrepresentation of high income households. Sam-
ple means and other unconditional statistics will be reported for the representative
panel only, so the numbers we present are representative of the Dutch population.
For 491 respondents we miss important demographic information such as age or
education, but mostly individual income, leaving us with 3458 observations. Fur-
thermore, there are 865 individuals giving the answer "Don’t know" to at least one
of the probability equivalence questions. Most of them did not answer any ques-
tion. This might be caused by lack of interest in this type of questions, but it can
5also be the case that these questions are rather di–cult (see Warneryd (1996) for a
discussion of this problem). We do not use observations with one or more missing
values to the probability equivalence questions, since these respondents might not
really understand the questions. The sample we use for estimation consists of 2593
individuals for whom we observe both tha answers to the questions on the lotteries
and the individual characteristics we want to use in explaining the individuals risk
attitudes. These include 237 respondents who gave an inconsistent set of answers,
satisfying either PE1 >PE 2;PE 2 >PE 3 or PE1 >PE 3:
The fraction of respondents choosing the riskiest option in the choice questions
are presented in Table 1. The table shows that the number of individuals choosing
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the choice questions, representative panel only.
fraction choosing Safest Riskiest
Question riskiest lottery „ ￿ „ ￿
CH1 (1000;1) vs. (2000;0.5) 0.21 1000 0 1000 1000
CH2 (30;1) vs. (45;0.8) 0.40 30 0 36 18
CH3 (100;0.25) vs. (130;0.20) 0.49 25 42 26 52
CH4 (3000;0.02) vs. (6000;0.01) 0.56 60 420 60 597
CH5 (0;1) vs. (1500;0.5,-1000;0.5) 0.12 0 0 250 1250
Note: (x;p) denotes the lottery paying x with probability p and zero otherwise,
while (x;p;y;q) denotes the lottery paying x with probability p and y with
probability q:
the riskiest lottery varies considerably across the questions. This is largely due to the
diﬁerence in expected value, „; between the two lotteries relative to the diﬁerence in
risk, ￿; taken. For CH1 and CH4; there is no reward for the extra risk taken, i.e., the
expected value of the two lotteries is the same. Respondents choosing the riskiest
option in one of these two questions show risk loving behavior. Note, however, that
some non-expected utility theories are able to explain this behavior, even if the
marginal utility of money is decreasing, which would be equivalent with the regular
concept of risk aversion under expected utility as it is deﬂned by Pratt (1964) and
6Arrow (1965). Aspects of these theories that can be relevant are the certainty eﬁect
in CH1 and CH2: For CH4 subproportionality can be important, while for CH5 it
is loss aversion.
The mean and median of the probability equivalence questions can be found in
Table 2. The mean of the answers to PE1 is a 34% chance of winning D￿ 20,000,
while the median answer to this question is 25%. The other columns have to be read
in a similar way. There is a clear pattern of increasing answers if we go from PE1
to PE3, but there is also substantial variation across respondents for each question.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the probability equivalence questions
PE1 PE2 PE3
(200;1) vs. (20,000;p) (1000;1) vs. (20,000;p) (5000;1) vs. (20,000;p)
Mean 34.0% 45.6% 62.3%
Median 25% 50% 60%
3 A semiparametric model for risk attitudes
Many papers have estimated attitudes towards risk using speciﬂc functional forms to
represent preferences, see, for example, Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992), Tversky
and Kahneman (1992), and Beetsma and Schotman (1997). Exceptions are Wakker
and Deneﬁe (1996) and Abdellaoui (1998).
In this section we will not specify any functional forms. For the choice questions
we assume that Ef1 ¡ CHqjxg = Pfsafest choice is chosen in question qjxg =
Gq(x0ﬂq); with x a vector of observed characteristics such as age and income. ﬂq
is a parameter vector that has to be estimated. The function Gq(:) is unknown,
but assumed to be increasing. A higher value of x0ﬂq; the individual speciﬂc index,
now implies a higher probability for the safe option being chosen and thus more risk
aversion.
For the probability equivalence questions we make a similar assumption, which
7is that EfPEqjxg = F q(x0ﬂq):xdenotes a vector of observed characteristics and ﬂq
av e c t o ro fp a r a m e t e r s .T e hf u n c t i o nF q(:) is not known, but assumed to be increas-
ing. Higher values og x0ﬂq imply, on average, a higher answer to the probability
equivalence question. As was the case for the choice questions, a higher value of
x0ﬂq implies more risk aversion. Therefore we will refer to this index as a measure
of risk aversion.
We do not assume that the index is the same for each question. One of the
interesting questions now is whether the indices for each of the questions are the
same. When we present the estimation results, we will also present the results of
some tests on equivalence of the indiced. If, for example, loss aversion is stronger for
one group of individuals and small probabilities are more overweighted by another
group, we could obtain diﬁerent estimates for CH4 and CH5: This then indicates
that we are not able to model the respondents’ behavior towards all the questions
with a single index.
With these assumptions the scale of ﬂq is not identiﬂed and we normalize the
component of ﬂq that relates to the individual’s gender, say the ﬂrst component,
such that jﬂ
q
1j = 1. The sign of ﬂ
q
1 and thus whether females are more or less risk
averse than males is identiﬂed. These assumptions and some technical regularity
conditions are su–cient to obtain a consistent estimator for ﬂq for each question
separately, using the rank estimator proposed by Cavanagh and Sherman (1998),
which is an extension of the maximum rank correlation estimator of Han (1987). One
practical problem with this estimator is that the objective function does not behave
very well with the data we have, which is due to properties of the objective function
in small samples. We solved this problem by replacing the objective function with a
smoothed version, following the idea of Horowitz (1992), which, under appropriate
regularity assumptions, does not change the asymptotic properties of the estimator.
For the probability equivalence questions we can use this initial estimator and the
method proposed by Delecroix, H˜ ardle, and Hristache (1997) to obtain asymptotic
8e–ciency by a one step estimator based on the initial estimate. For the choice
questions we use the same approach, where the e–cient estimator is based on the
ideas in Klein and Spady (1993). Technical details about the estimators are given
in Appendix B.
With the method described above, we obtain e–cient estimates of ﬂq for each
question. Since we are interested in a single measure of risk attitude per person and
not in a measure of risk attitude per person for each question, we will test whether
the estimated coe–cients for the diﬁerent questions are actually the same and thus
whether there exists a unique measure of attitude towards risk for the questions
we have. To combine the estimates from the diﬁerent questions we use minimum
distance (see Lee (1996), for example). Here we take into account the fact that
we observe the same individual more than once and the estimates for the diﬁerent
questions are not independent.
4 Estimation results for the semiparametric model
This section presents the estimation results for the semiparametric model deﬂned in
the previous section. Tables 3 and 4 present the estimates for ﬂ and the correspond-
ing standard errors for each of the questions separately. As explanatory variables
in our model we use a dummy variable for gender, age, the logarithm of income,
and education level measured on a scale from 1 to 5. For some of the respondents
we did not observe their personal income, or it was zero. For these respondents
Log(Income) was set to zero and a dummy, Dinczero, was included to correct for
this. Some descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are given in Appendix
A.2.
The estimates are all signiﬂcant, except for the eﬁect of income on CH1 and
the eﬁect of education on CH5: The estimates for the three probability equivalence
questions are very similar, even though the estimates are computed completely in-
dependent from each other. Also the signs of the estimates for CH2;CH 3,a n dCH4
9Table 3: Estimation results for ﬂ for the choice questions. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
CH1 CH2 CH3 CH4 CH5
Female 1 (||{) 1 (||{) 1 (||{) 1 (||{) 1 (||{)
Age 0.032 (0.004) 0.031 (0.003) 0.031 (0.004) 0.214 (0.022) 0.031 (0.008)
Log(Income) -0.080 (0.046) -0.364 (0.048) -0.171 (0.043) -1.127 (0.134) 0.125 (0.058)
Education 0.088 (0.026) -0.280 (0.030) -0.088 (0.022) -0.272 (0.041) 0.063 (0.037)
Dinczero -0.578 (0.477) -3.530 (0.488) -1.930 (0.449) -8.419 (1.056) 1.232 (0.551)
Table 4: Estimation results for ﬂ for the probability equivalence questions. Standard
errors in parentheses.
PE1 PE2 PE3
Female 1 (||{) 1 (||{) 1 (||{)
Age 0.029 (0.001) 0.031 (0.001) 0.032 (0.001)
Log(Income) -0.423 (0.021) -0.437 (0.022) -0.450 (0.022)
Education -0.446 (0.016) -0.454 (0.017) -0.463 (0.017)
Dinczero -3.180 (0.190) -3.274 (0.199) -3.372 (0.203)
10are the same. Similar results are also obtained using regression and probit models.
From the estimates we see that females and old people are more risk averse, while
individuals with a higher education level or a higher income are less risk averse.
The estimate of the parameter for the dummy indicating that the individual has
no personal income indicates that the level of risk aversion for such an individual is
similar to the risk aversion of an individual with an average income. The extent to
which a diﬁerent value for the index results in diﬁerent behavior will be discussed
at the end of this section.
Table 5: Minimum distance estimates for ﬂ. Standard errors in parentheses.
All questions only PE questions
Female 1 (||{) 1 (||{)
Age 0.024 (0.001) 0.031 (0.001)
Log(Income) -0.293 (0.007) -0.436 (0.008)
Education -0.321 (0.005) -0.454 (0.006)
Dinczero -2.160 (0.063) -3.273 (0.070)
Since we are interested in a single measure of risk aversion, we combine the esti-
mates for the questions using minimum distance with an optimal weighting matrix.
The ﬂrst column of Table 5 presents the resulting estimate for ﬂ using the choice
and the probability equivalence questions jointly. However, when we test the hy-
pothesis that the original estimates for the questions are estimates of the same ﬂ;
this hypothesis is strongly rejected.4 The correlation between the estimated indices,
however, is high, ranging from 0.56 to 0.99. Looking at the questions, there is a
large diﬁerence between the choice questions and the probability equivalence ques-
tions. The choice questions themselves also apply to diﬁerent aspects of individual
decision making, which were discussed when we presented the questions. When we
test whether the estimates for ﬂ that we derived from the choice questions are the
4The test is based on the scaled sum of squares of the diﬁerences between the original estimates
and the minimum distance estimate and follows a ￿2 distribution.
11same, this hypothesis is again strongly rejected. For the probability equivalence
questions we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are estimates for a unique ﬂ:
The minimum distance estimate for ﬂ using only the probability equivalence ques-
tions is presented in the second column of Table 5. The hypothesis that the index
for one of the choice questions was the same as the joint index for the probability
equivalence questions was rejected for each of the choice questions. In the rest of
this section we will refer to the index based on the probability equivalence questions
as the index of risk aversion. We will denote this index with x0ﬂPE: The fact that
the probability equivalence questions, in general, induce high levels of risk aversion
has no consequences, since the index only represents an ordering of the respondents
with respect to their level of risk aversion.
We now give a possible interpretation of the most important diﬁerences between
the parameter estimates for the diﬁerent questions. In general, we can say that
the eﬁect of education and income on the index is smaller in the choice questions
than in the probability equivalence questions. The eﬁect of age is similar for all the
questions except for CH4; where the eﬁect is much stronger, even if we compare it
with the other coe–cients. Subproportionality of the probability weighting function
might be more important for old people.
For CH5 the estimated parameters for income and education in the index are
diﬁerent from the other questions. Since this question involves a loss, we can inter-
pret the observed diﬁerence in the parameter estimate as being related to an index
for loss aversion. Loss aversion means that losses have a larger disutility than gains
of the same magnitude. For a detailed description of loss aversion and its possible
causes see Kahneman et al. (1991). The diﬁerence between the estimate for CH5
and the other estimates then implies that loss aversion is less decreasing with income
and education level than an individual’s risk attitude.
We estimated our model under the assumption that the answers to the questions
depend on the level of risk aversion and that the answers are increasing in risk





































Figure 1: Estimated conditional expectation of PE1; PE2; and PE3 as a function
of the index.
aversion. In Figure 1 a plot is made of EfPEqjx0ﬂPEg for the three questions, where,
as the consistency requirement indicates, the lowest line is for PE1; the middle line
for PE2; and the highest line for PE3: We do not include conﬂdence bands in the
ﬂgure, since they make the ﬂgure unreadable, but based on uniform conﬂdence bands
we can conclude that the monotonicity of neither of the three lines is rejected and
that the three conditional expectations are signiﬂcantly diﬁerent from each other.
An estimate of the density of the index value of the respondents in our sample is
presented in Figure 2. Given the fact that the density of the index is well spread over
the interval [¡2;3];we can conclude from Figure 1 that there is substantial variation
in the individual’s risk attitudes in our sample. There is, however, also a lot of
unexplained variation. A measure of ﬂt5 based on the usual R2 measure obtains
values of 0.023, 0.067, and 0.092 for PE3;P E 2; and PE1; respectively, indicating
that we explain relatively more for the ﬂrst two questions, PE1 and PE2:
Although we had to reject the hypothesis that we could use a single index to















prediction error for respondent i:
13Figure 2: Estimated density for the index, x0ﬂPE:
model all the questions, it can still be the case that the measure of attitude towards
risk derived from the probability equivalence questions has some predictive power
for the choice questions. If this is not the case, it might not make a lot of sense
to pay attention to such a measure, since it could be too dependent on the form of
the questions and might have hardly anything to say about a more general attitude
towards risk. However, if we do ﬂnd signiﬂcant relationships between the answers to
the choice questions and the index based on the probability equivalence questions,
we can interpret the index as a general measure of risk aversion. To check whether
t h ei n d e xa l s oh a ss o m ep r e d i c t i v ep o w e rf o rt h ec h o i c eq u e s t i o n si nt h es e n s et h a t
a higher index for an individual is related to a higher probability of choosing the
safest option we performed nonparametric regressions of the answers to the choice
questions on the index derived from the probability equivalence questions. The
results of these regressions are presented in Figure 3.
For each question the estimated conditional expectation tends to increase. We
used uniform conﬂdence bands to formally test the null hypothesis that the functions
are ￿at horizontal lines. For CH1 and CH5 we are not able to reject this hypothesis.
For the other three questions we could reject this hypothesis and the conditional
expectation for each of these questions signiﬂcantly depends on our measure of









































Figure 3: Estimated conditional expectation for the choice questions. From top to
bottom we have CH5;C H 1;C H 2;C H 3; and CH4:
risk attitude. We can thus conclude that even though we could not model all the
questions with a single index, we can still obtain an index that is related to all the
questions and that can thus be interpreted as a general measure of risk aversion.
However, from the relationships that are depicted in Figures 1 and 3 we cannot
conclude very much about the way the underlying decision process changes if the
value of the index changes. The next section presents a structural model of the
individual’s decision making process, which will help us to interpret the results
discussed above.
5 A structural model for the individual’s decision
making process
In economics the basic tool to deal with decision making under uncertainty is the
expected utility model. This means that preferences over probability distributions
can be represented by an expected utility function Efu(x)g·
R
X u(x)dF(x); where
u(x) is a utility function and the expectation is taken with respect to the proba-
15bility distribution, F. Two well known measures of risk aversion are derived by




0(x) is a (local) measure of relative risk aversion, while ¡
u00(x)
u0(x) is a (local)
measure of absolute risk aversion. These are the types of concepts we are interested
in. However, a lot of systematic violations of expected utility maximizing behavior
have been found using questions on lotteries, one of the most famous being the Allais
paradox (Allais, 1953). A good description of the evidence can be found in Kahne-
man, Slovic and Tversky (1982), while more recent surveys are found in Machina
(1987) and Camerer (1989). With this evidence in mind various theories have been
developed to explain the observed deviations from expected utility theory. Typical
examples of these theories are given by Bell (1982, 1985), Gul (1995), Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), Loomes and Sugden (1982), Machina (1982), Quiggin (1982),
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Viscusi (1989).
We choose to model the individual’s decision process by Cumulative Prospect
Theory (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), which is the modern version of Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). We prefer Cumulative Prospect Theory
(CPT) over the other theories, mainly because CPT remains closest to Expected
Utility Theory in the sense that the value of a certain lottery does not depend on
the other lottery that is oﬁered. Another advantage is that more general problems
(for example, choices out of sets of 3 lotteries) can still be handled with CPT, while
the generalizations of the other theories are not clear. Machina’s (1982) theory seems
rather di–cult to use in an empirical application and Gul’s (1995) Disappointment
Aversion is, given our data, observationally equivalent with Prospect Theory for a
speciﬂc form of the probability transformations.6
CPT provides us with a representation of preferences, deﬂned over lotteries on
a real interval. Our discussion will concentrate on prospects, which are lotteries
with a ﬂnite number of possible outcomes. General prospects are denoted by P and
6Gul makes this observation when he discusses choices between binary lotteries on p. 677.
16represent a set of n ordered outcomes x1 ￿ :::￿ xk ￿ 0 ￿ xk+1 ￿ :::￿ xn,w i t h
corresponding probabilities p1;:::;p n:
In CPT the decision process consists of two phases: the editing phase and the
evaluation phase. When deciding on the choice between lotteries an individual starts
with the editing phase. The major operations in this phase are coding, combination,
and cancellation. In this phase the decision problem is also simpliﬂed. Dominated
lotteries are rejected, very small probability events deleted and probabilities and
outcomes rounded oﬁ. This phase already explains some of the expected utility
anomalies reported in the literature. Even though we have very simple lotteries,
this phase might be relevant, since there might be shifts in reference points or other
types of framing eﬁects. Evidence on the presence of framing eﬁects is documented
in, for example, Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) for the diﬁerence between proba-
bility equivalence questions and certainty equivalence questions. Recently, Seidl and
Traub (1997) discuss the diﬁerences and possible causes for a broader range of ques-
tions. A more general discussion about framing eﬁects can be found in, for example,
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991).
In the evaluation phase CPT preferences over (edited) prospects are represented



























Here v(x)r e p r e s e n t savalue function for money outcomes, which is strictly
increasing and continuous. v(0) is set to 0 as a normalization. w+(:):[ 0 ;1] ! [0;1]
and w¡(:):[ 0 ;1] ! [0;1] are probability weighting functions, which transform the
cumulative distribution function to a new function, similar to a distribution function.
w+(:) is used for outcomes in the positive domain, while w¡(:) is used for negative
outcomes. Both w+(:)a n dw¡(:) are strictly increasing and w+(0) = w¡(0) = 0 and
w+(1) = w¡(1) = 1:
The weights assigned to the values of the outcomes when evaluating a lottery are
17called decision weights. The decision weights result from the transformed cumulative
distribution function in the same way as probabilities result from the cumulative








One of the important features of CPT is that v(:) is deﬂned over the lottery prizes,
which are changes in wealth and not ﬂnal wealth. The model uses a reference point
and thus allows the magnitude of the eﬁect of a gain to be diﬁerent from the eﬁect
of an equally large loss. Individuals now are supposed to choose the lottery with
the highest V value.
There has already been extensive research (see, among others, Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992) and Tversky and Fox (1995 )) on the properties of the decision weights
as transformed probabilities and, in general, it is found that small probabilities are
overweighted while larger probabilities are underweighted. An example of a proba-
bility weighting function, w+(p)o rw¡(p); is given in Figure 4.
Figure 4: An example of a probability weighting function
Behavior towards risk is in CPT, unlike in expected utility theory, determined not
only by the value function, v(:); but also by the transformation of the probabilities,
18w(:): There is some debate on what deﬂnes risk attitude within non-expected utility
models, but for CPT a clear discussion of the two aspects is given by Wakker (1994).
He separates the eﬁects of risk aversion in terms of v(:)a n dw(:), where the eﬁect
of v(:) is called decreasing, constant or increasing marginal utility, while the eﬁect
of w(:) is called probabilistic risk aversion. The eﬁect of v(:) can be characterized
by the usual Arrow-Pratt measure ¡
v00(x)
v0(x); while the eﬁect of w(:)i sm e a s u r e db yi t s
convexity which can be expressed similarly. Both a stronger decrease of marginal
utility7 and a more convex transformation from probabilities to decision weights
cause an individual to be more averse towards risk. The total eﬁect depends on the
prospect under consideration.
6 An empirical model for Cumulative Prospect
Theory
The estimation results from the reduced form model in Section 4 show that individ-
ual characteristics in￿uence an individual’s choices in the questions that are asked,
but it does not provide us with full information about the way this happens. Possibly
an individual’s value function varies with this index, but also the way probabilities
are transformed into decision weights can be diﬁerent across individuals. From
the semiparametric estimation results we concluded that a single index may be too
restrictive to model all the questions adequately. To test whether a model using
diﬁerent indices for the value and probability transformation function is able to ﬂt
all questions, one would like to use a structural model with separate indices for each
of the questions. With such a model one can test whether the indices are the same
for the diﬁerent questions. Unfortunately, however, we cannot identify the decision
weights, the value function and framing eﬁects separately on the basis of one choice.
7A stronger decrease of marginal utility for individual 2 compared to individual 1 is equivalent
with v2 = ` – v1,w i t h` a continuous, concave and strictly increasing function. We will call v2
more concave than v1:
19For this reason we will not use the choice questions in the analysis that follows. For
the probability equivalence questions the semiparametric estimation results showed
that we can use the same index for the three questions. We use these three questions
to determine the way in which the observed characteristics in￿uence the decisions
an individual makes. We use Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) to model the
individual’s decision process.
The most general speciﬂcation of the CPT preference representation (1) for
prospects with one positive outcome, x; with probability p and 0 otherwise is:
Vi(0;(1 ¡ p);x;p) · w
+
i (p)vi(x)( 2 )
The subscript i indicates that the function depends on the individual. Since both
w and v might vary across individuals we want to allow both functions to depend
on an individual’s observed characteristics. We thus allow each function to depend
separately on an index, x0
iﬂv for v and x0
iﬂw for w; where xi i sav e c t o ro fo b s e r v e d
characteristics and ﬂv and ﬂw are vectors of parameters that have to be estimated.
Linearity of the index is not such a strong assumption since the index is allowed to
enter the model nonlinearly. For both indices we set the parameter for gender to 1
as a normalization. If ﬂv and ﬂw are the same, the model is a single index model as
in Section 3.
For the choice of the functional form of the value function, vi in (2), we follow
the approach by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), and use the power function vi(x)=
(x)
ﬁi ; where we allow ﬁi to depend on the index x0




For the probability weighting function, w
+
i in (2), we take the speciﬂcation that
is implied by the axiomatization of Prelec (1998), Proposition 1(A), so w
+
i (p)=
exp(¡(¡lnp)￿i); where we allow ￿i to depend on the index for the probability
weighting function x0
iﬂw in an a–ne way, so ￿i = ￿0 + ￿1(x0
iﬂw): The more gen-
8The indices are calculated using centered explanatory variables so the average for the indices
is 0:
20eral form of w+(p) as presented by Prelec in proposition 1(B) is not identiﬂed given
our choice for v(x):
In general, the eﬁect of ￿i in the probability weighting function on an individual’s
risk attitude is not straightforward, since it is not directly linked to the convexity of
the probability weighting function. The eﬁect of ﬁi in the value function, however,
is clear. A lower value of ﬁi implies a more concave value function and thus more
aversion towards risk. We deﬂne more risk aversion as having a more concave value
function and thus a lower value of ﬁi.
For the probability equivalence questions we assume that the respondents an-
swered the questions in such a way that they are indiﬁerent between the amount of
money for sure and a lottery with a prize of D￿ 20,000, which might be won with the
probability they answer. This implies that, for example, PE1 satisﬂes the follow-
ing equality: w+(PE1
100 )v(20;000) = v(200). However, given the empirical evidence on
framing eﬁects, we want to allow for such eﬁects. We cannot distinguish between the
framing eﬁects of the type of question we use, compared to other types of questions
such as certainty equivalence questions, but we can identify diﬁerences between the
questions. The framing eﬁects we will estimate are based on the diﬁerences between
the questions that are not explained by the CPT model. The estimates of the CPT
parameters, especially the level of risk aversion, are still in￿uenced by the fact that
we use probability equivalence questions instead of an other type of question.
The estimated framing eﬁects might contain systematic diﬁerences due to mis-
speciﬂcation of our model, but in general framing eﬁects are the result of a diﬁerent
interpretation by the respondents due to diﬁerent questions. With our questions
the respondents might adjust their reference point, since there is the possibility of
having an amount of money for sure. If this is the case, this causes systematic dif-
ferences between the model’s predictions and actual behavior. The extent to which
the reference point is adjusted might even depend on the amount of money. Such
behavior is di–cult to model explicitly and we allow for such factors by allowing the
21level of ﬁi to vary over the questions. We assume that the framing eﬁects, denoted
by f1;f 2; and f3 for PE1;PE 2,a n dPE3 respectively, are additive constants to ﬁi
in each question. For PE1;ﬁ i increases with f1 and similarly f2 and f3 are added
to ﬁi for PE2 and PE3; respectively. Since the framing eﬁects are not identiﬂed
separately from ﬁ0; we assume that the average framing eﬁect equals zero. We thus
set f1 + f2 + f3 = 0 as an identifying restriction. We will distinguish between
vi; which is the individual’s value function, and v
f
i ; which is the individual’s value
function taking framing eﬁects into account. vi is the same for each question, while
v
f
i can vary across the questions due to the framing eﬁects. Notice that we assume
that the probability weighting function is the same for each question and not af-
fected by framing eﬁects. This is only by assumption and the same results can be
obtained if we ﬂx the value function and allow the probability weighting function to
vary across the questions in a speciﬂc manner. This should be taken into account
when interpreting the results. The estimation results for the indices that control the
variation between individuals are not in￿uenced by the assumption that only the
value function is in￿uence by the framing eﬁects.
To allow for measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity we introduce a
random component with a lognormal distribution in our model . For PE1 our ﬂnal








with ·1jx » Lognormal(0;￿2
1)=LN(0;￿ 2
1)
w+(p)=e x p f¡(¡ln(p))￿0+￿1(x0ﬂw)g
vf(x)=xﬁ0+ﬁ1(x0ﬂv)+ﬁ2(x0ﬂv)2+f1
The same speciﬂcation is used for the other two questions with the framing eﬁect
and the value 200 replaced by the corresponding values for the other questions. To
take into account the fact that we observe three questions for each individual and
to allow for unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error in our measure of
22risk aversion we specify a general correlation structure between the errors for the
diﬁerent questions. The distribution of · =( ·1;· 2;· 3)0 is LN(0;§); with § a full
covariance matrix and · is assumed to be independent from x:
We estimated the model using maximum likelihood. Table 6 presents the es-
Table 6: Estimation results for ﬂv and ﬂ…. Standard errors in parentheses.
ﬂv ﬂw
Female 1 1
Age 0.035 (0.009) 0.075 (0.026)
Log(inc) -0.392 (0.114) -0.581 (0.272)
Edu -0.453 (0.096) 0.023 (0.081)
Dinczero -2.782 (1.054) -4.731 (2.367)
timates for ﬂv and ﬂw: The estimates for ﬂv a r ev e r ys i m i l a rt ot h ee s t i m a t e sw e
obtained with the semiparametric estimation techniques. The estimate for ﬂw shows
that the observed individual characteristics have a diﬁerent eﬁect on the probability
weighting function. The eﬁects of age and income are larger relative to the eﬁect of
gender, while the eﬁect of education is insigniﬂcant. The estimates indicate that the
diﬁerence between the true probabilities and the decision weights that are used in
the decision making process is larger for females and older people. Individuals with
a higher income transform the probabilities to a lesser degree. The fact that the
probability weighting function and the value function depend on the individual’s
characteristics through diﬁerent indices con￿icts with the semiparametric model,
which is based on the assumption that there is only one index in￿uencing the in-
dividual’s decision process. The fact that the index for the value function, x0
iﬂv; is
so similar to the semiparametrically estimated index, could re￿ect the small eﬁect
of ﬂw: The explained variation due to variation in x0
iﬂw is very small. If we take as
a measure of ﬂt the variance of the point forecasts9 relative to the variance of the
answers, this measure is less than 0.002 for each question if we set x0
iﬂv =0 : If we set




iﬂw =0 ; this measure is 0.02, 0.07, and 0.12 for PE3;PE 2; and PE1; respectively,
so the variation due to x0
iﬂv is much larger than the variation due to x0
iﬂw: The
results from the semiparametric model are thus very closely related to the variation
in v; giving us a possible interpretation for the semiparametrically estimated index
x0
iﬂPE: Still the restriction on the model that the probability weighting function is
the same for each individual is strongly rejected.
Table 7: Estimation results for the CPT parameters. Standard errors in parentheses.
Parameters for w Parameters for v
￿0 ￿1 ﬁ0 ﬁ1 ﬁ2
0.393 (0.006) -0.016 (0.005) 0.357 (0.003) -0.021 (0.004) 0.003 (0.001)
The parameters determining the shape of the probability weighting function and
the value function are presented in Table 7. For the decision weighting function we
see that the estimate for ￿0; the parameter that determines the level of ￿, is 0.393 and
signiﬂcantly diﬁerent from 1; which is the case where the decision weights would be
equal to the probabilities and expected utility would be valid. The estimate of ￿1; the
parameter relating to the variation of ￿ across individuals, is signiﬂcant and results in
a variation of ￿i between 0.32 and 0.44. Given the estimated value function expected
utility is strongly rejected. With these estimates we cannot conclude anything about
the level of probabilistic risk aversion as it is deﬂned by Wakker (1994), since ￿i is
not related to the convexity of the probability transformation.
The estimates for ﬁ imply that, with the index x0
iﬂv varying between -2.7 and
3.7, for each individual ﬁi < 1; which indicates that individuals have decreasing
marginal utility. The estimates for ﬁ1 and ﬁ2 show that there is signiﬂcant variation
in the level of ﬁi. The size of the variation is, however, di–cult to derive from these
numbers. To give an idea about the variation across individuals and the predictions
of our model, we plotted vi for the three questions (with corresponding amounts of
money) for diﬁerent values of the index, x0
iﬂv. This is done in the left panel of Figure
5. We normalized the scale of vi such that vi(20;000) = 1: With this normalization
24Figure 5: Predictions from the estimated CPT model excluding framing eﬁects.
vi; evaluated at the amount of money that is relevant for the question, equals the
decision weight that is needed to be indiﬁerent between the lottery ticket and that
amount of money for sure as follows from (3). The variation in the predicted values
for the decision weights in this ﬂgure is the eﬁect of diﬁerences across individuals in
the value function.
What we actually observe in the data are not the decision weights, but proba-
bilities. In the right hand panel we plotted the probabilities that correspond to the
decision weights in the left hand panel.10 Due to the transformation of the proba-
bilities to decision weights there is more variation in the answers than would have
been the case is respondents did not transform the probabilities.
Table 8: Estimation results for the framing eﬁects. Standard errors in parentheses.
f1 f2 f3
-0.125 (0.002) -0.048 (0.001) 0.174 (0.003)
The estimates for the framing eﬁects of the diﬁerences between the questions are
10Since the probability weighting function diﬁered across individuals through a second index,
x0
iﬂ…, we set this index to 0 and used the ’average’ probability weighting function with ￿ =0 :393:
25Figure 6: Predictions from the estimated CPT model including framing eﬁects.
presented in Table 8. The framing eﬁects are highly signiﬂcant and imply higher
answers for PE1 and PE2; while for PE3 the answers are lower than without the
framing eﬁects. One of the reasons for this could be that our choice of functional
forms is wrong, but a shift in reference points induced by the diﬁerent amounts in
the questions seems a better explanation. Making the reference point endogenous
in the model, however, is rather di–cult.
Figure 6 presents the same model predictions as Figure 5, but now v
f
i is used
instead of vi: The value function that is used to evaluate the diﬁerent lotteries thus
depends on the question. Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 6 we see that there is
a clear need to understand framing eﬁects in more detail, since they have a large
impact on model predictions. We can conclude from these ﬂgures, however, that
there is substantial variation in attitude towards risk across individuals and that we
can predict part of this variation.
The estimates for the parameters in § are presented in Table 9. The correlation
between the errors for the diﬁerent questions for each individual are high, as could
be expected. This indicates that there is still a lot of systematic variation at the
individual level after we have taken out the systematic variation due to the observed
26Table 9: Estimation results for the parameters in §.
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
‰12 0.831 (0.005) ￿1 0.371 (0.009)
‰23 0.793 (0.007) ￿2 0.363 (0.008)
‰13 0.593 (0.013) ￿3 0.365 (0.007)
characteristics.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated whether attitude towards risk is related to some com-
monly observed individual characteristics. Using semiparametric estimation tech-
niques we ﬂnd signiﬂcant relationships between the answers to a set of questions on
lotteries and age, gender, income, and education level. Females and older people
have a more negative attitude towards risk, while income and education level are
positively related to an individual’s attitude towards risk. We focussed on the index
that is derived from the three probability questions and, even though we rejected
the hypothesis that we could use a single index for all the questions, we found posi-
tive relationships between the choices that are made in the choice questions and the
index derived from the probability equivalence questions. It thus seems justiﬂed to
use such an index as a general measure of risk aversion. Implementing this measure
of risk aversion into a model for savings or asset holdings could be used to prove the
usefulness of measuring individual risk aversion, but this is left for future research.
To obtain more insight into the way the decision process diﬁers across the indi-
viduals, we estimated a parametric model based on CPT. The speciﬂcation allowed
the value function and the probability weighting function to depend on the observed
characteristics through two separate indices. Also systematic deviations from the
model, due to, for example, framing eﬁects, are allowed for.
The probability weighting function varies systematically with age, income, and
27gender, while the value function depends on the observed characteristics similarly
to the relationship we found with the semiparametric estimates. This gives a nice
interpretation to the results from the semiparametric model: The semiparametrically
estimated index seems to be related to the value function.
Using the decomposition of attitudes towards risk into decreasing/increasing
marginal utility and probabilistic risk aversion our results indicate that individuals
have decreasing marginal utility. Higher values for the estimated index imply a
stronger decrease of marginal utility. Our speciﬂcation does not allow us to say
anything about probabilistic risk aversion, but the decision weights are signiﬂcantly
diﬁerent from the true probabilities. For older people and females the diﬁerence is
largest, while income has a negative eﬁect on the diﬁerence.
These results are, however, based on a simple speciﬂcation and complete iden-
tiﬂcation of the in￿uence of the value function and the probability transformation
can only be based on a richer set of questions. One possibility to do this might be
the use of a very large questionnaire as was done by Kahneman and Tversky, but
it seems more fruitful in a survey to incorporate a shorter, but well designed set of
questions. The ideas of Wakker and Deneﬁe (1996) on how to identify the utility
function without speciﬂcation of the decision weights might be a good starting point
for this.
28AD a t a
A.1 Questions
The ﬂrst type of questions are the probability equivalence questions. In this type
of questions, the probability is asked which would make the individual indiﬁerent
between a lottery ticket with probability p of winning 20,000 or a prespeciﬂed amount
of money for sure.
The exact question is:
Imagine you have won D￿ amountk in a game. You can now choose between keeping
that D￿ amountk; or having a lottery ticket with a certain chance to win a prize of
D￿ 20,000.
How high would that chance to win D￿ 20,000 have to be such that you would
prefer the lottery ticket to keeping the D￿ amountk that you had already won?
I would prefer the lottery ticket if the chance to win the ﬂrst prize would be at
least.......... PEk%
This question was asked three times, with amountk being D￿ 200, D￿ 1,000, and
D￿ 5,000.
29T h es e c o n dt y p eo fq u e s t i o ni so nc h o i c e sb e t w e e nt w oo p p o r t u n i t i e s ,w h e r e
preference for one or the other has to be stated.
The following information is given to the individuals.
You are probably familiar with games shown on television, where people win prizes
and can choose between several options. For example, they can choose to keep a
certain prize, or they can choose to take a chance to get a much bigger prize, at the
risk of losing the prize all together.
The following questions present similar choices, concerning amounts of money.
Some of the amounts are certain for you to have, others you can win in a lottery.
We would like to know which choice you would make. There are no right or
wrong answers with these questions.
CH1 We toss a coin once. You may choose one of the following two options:
† You receive D￿ 1,000 with either heads or tails
† With heads you receive D￿ 2,000, with tails you don’t receive anything
at all.
CH2 Which of the following two options would you choose?
† You draw a lottery ticket with an 80% chance to win D￿ 45 (if you loose,
you don’t get anything at all)
† You win D￿ 30, no matter which ticket is drawn.
30CH3 Which of the following two options would you choose?
† You draw a lottery ticket with a 25% chance to win D￿ 100 (if you loose,
you don’t get anything at all)
† You draw a lottery ticket with a 20% chance to win D￿ 130 (if you loose,
you don’t get anything at all)
CH4 Which of the following two options would you choose?
† You draw a lottery ticket with a 2% chance of winning D￿ 3000 (if you
loose, you don’t get anything at all)
† You draw a lottery ticket with a 1% chance of winning D￿ 6000 (if you
loose, you don’t get anything at all)
CH5 We toss a coin once. Would you accept the following agreement? (yes/no)
† Heads, you win D￿ 1,500.
† Tails, you lose D￿ 1,000
31A.2 Descriptive statistics
This appendix contains the deﬂnition and some descriptive statistics of the variables
that are used as independent variables in the models that are estimated.
Table 10: Description of some variables
Variable Description Mean Std. dev.
Age Age (in years) 42.1 14.18
Female Dummy; 1 if female 0.43 0.50
Education Education level, 1,3,5 3.31 1.67
Log(Income) Log(gross annual individual income) 8.70 4.27
Dinczero Dummy; 1 if income equals zero 0.18 0.39
32B Semiparametric estimation method
In this appendix we describe the method of estimation we use for the semiparametric
model of section 3. We give a short description of the assumptions we make and the
choices for the bandwidths in the semiparametric estimators.
The main assumption is that for each question the distribution of the answers
for an individual i with characteristics xi depends on xi only though an index x0
iﬂ:
Let yi be individual i0s answer to the question under consideration. We then have
that f(yijxi)=f(yijx0
iﬂ); where f(yijxi) denotes the density function of yi given
xi.L e t Efyijx0
iﬂg denote the expectation of yi given x0
iﬂ; then we can write the
monotonicity assumption we make as Efyijx0
iﬂg = G(x0
iﬂ); with G0(:) > 0: We
also use a normalization for the parameter relating to gender. Preliminary analysis
showed that this variable had a signiﬂcant in￿uence on the answers, making it a
valid parameter for the normalization. For the estimator to be consistent, there also
needs to be at least one continuous variable that has a nonzero coe–cient. Both
age and income can satisfy this condition, but, due to the high correlation between
these two variables, it can be the case that only one of these variables is signiﬂcant
and it is not clear a priori which one is.
With these assumptions and some regularity conditions we can use the rank esti-
mator proposed by Cavanagh and Sherman (1998) (CS) to obtain a
p
N¡consistent















jﬂg; the rank if x0
iﬂ: CS prove that the objective
function is asymptotically smooth, even though the rank of x0
iﬂ is not a smooth
function. The small sample properties of the estimator, however, are not so nice
and optimization of the objective function turns out to be problematic in our case.















with F(:) the cumulative distribution function for the logistic distribution and hN
a smoothness parameter satisfying hN ! 0a sN !1 :
The initial
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Optimization of the objective function is performed with a Simplex algorithm. This
works well in practice. The estimate is not sensitive to the choice of hN in the
smoothed rank. For practical purposes we set hN =0 :1￿; with ￿ the estimated
standard deviation of x0
iﬂ; although it might not be valid to let hN depend on the
estimated parameter.
With this initial estimate a semiparametrically e–cient estimate is constructed
using a one-step improvement as proposed by Delecroix, H˜ ardle, and Hristache
(1997). We deﬂne Ln(ﬂ)a s 1
N§N
i=1 log(f(yijx0
iﬂ)), the likelihood function. Since we
do not know f(yijx0
iﬂ) we have to estimate it. This is done using kernel estimates.
We deﬂne ^ Ln(ﬂ)a s 1
N§N






















The e–cient estimate is now deﬂned by





















is negative deﬂnite. The gradient and Hessian need to be
computed using fourth order kernels. In small samples this can be problematic since
the density estimates can be negative. Instead of using the theoretically required
fourth order kernels, we will use a variable bandwidth kernel density estimator (see
Hall (1990) and Hall and Marron (1988)), which yields the same bias reduction,
while at the same time the density estimate is guaranteed to be positive. Numerical
34derivatives are used to compute the gradient, while the Hessian is computed as the
outer product of the gradient.
For the variable bandwidths we set hx =0 :0625 ^ f(x0^ ﬂrcs) in de denominator, hx =
0:0625 ^ f(y;x0^ ﬂrcs) in the numerator and hy =0 :125 ^ f(y;x0^ ﬂrcs); where ^ f(y;x0^ ﬂrcs)
and ^ f(x0^ ﬂrcs) are kernel estimates for the joint distribution of yi and x0
i^ ﬂrcs; and the
marginal distribution of x0
i^ ﬂrcs; respectively. Although Delecroix, H˜ ardle and Hris-
tache (1997) provide no theoretical justiﬂcation for a data dependent bandwidth, as
we use for the variable bandwidth kernel density estimator, we choose this approach
on practical grounds. The advantages of a guaranteed positive density and a bias
reduction that is the same as for fourth order kernels are large.
The values for the bandwidths are based on visual observation. Since the method
described above uses undersmoothed bandwidths, we select bandwidths in the region
where the density estimates are not very smooth. Within a large range of bandwidth
choices the estimates did not vary very much. Standard errors for the estimates are
also computed using numerical derivatives. They were more sensitive to the choice
of bandwidths, but, for a reasonable range of bandwidths, they do not diﬁer by more
than 25% from the estimates we present here.
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